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In an article previously published by the APSR, Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla claim that the deci-sion making of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been constrained—systematically—by thethreat of override on the part of member state governments, acting collectively, and by the threat of
noncompliance on the part of any single state. They also purport to have found strong evidence in favor
of intergovernmentalist, but not neofunctionalist, integration theory. On the basis of analysis of the same
data, we demonstrate that the threat of override is not credible and that the legal system is activated, rather
than paralyzed, by noncompliance. Moreover, when member state governments did move to nullify the
effects of controversial ECJ rulings, they failed to constrain the court, which continued down paths
cleared by the prior rulings. Finally, in a head-to-head showdown between intergovernmentalism and
neofunctionalism, the latter wins in a landslide.
In “Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints:Evidence from the European Court of Justice,”Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla (CGH; 2008) make
two startling claims. First, after examining the impact
of member state government (MSG) briefs on the rul-
ings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on 3,176
legal questions over an 11-year period (January 1987–
December 1997), the authors declare that its decision
making has been constrained by the threat of override
on the part of governments, acting collectively, and by
the threat of noncompliance on the part of any single
MSG: “Our analysis provides systematic evidence that
judges at the ECJ are sensitive to these two constraints.
Moreover, these threats have a substantively large ef-
fect on judicial rulings” (449). Second, the authors state
that their findings support the tenets of “intergovern-
mentalist” but not “neofunctional” integration theory.
Because these two claims starkly conflict with virtually
all of the empirical research on the topic undertaken
over the past two decades, and because they were pub-
lished in the APSR, the article attracted wide notice in
the European Union (EU) politics field.
In this response, we demonstrate that neither of
these claims is supported by their data. Although we
believe that CGH’s project is flawed in fundamental
respects, we sought to evaluate it from within the pa-
rameters set by their project. We gathered and analyzed
data exclusively from cases in CGH’s data set; we em-
ployed the basic elements of their method for assessing
the impact of MSG preferences on the decision making
of the court; and we accepted, for the purposes of re-
ply, CGH’s own preferred constructions of integration
theory.1
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1 We discuss our own views, in light of CGH, in Stone Sweet and
Brunell (2011).
THEORY AND METHOD
CGH revive ideas put forward, but not tested, by
Garrett (1992) and Garrett and Weingast (1993). In
this account, the policy preferences of the most power-
ful member states constrain the evolution of the ECJ’s
case law, not least because the court fears being overrid-
den. CGH also point to a well-known methodological
issue that bedevils research on anticipatory reactions
more generally: When the mechanism works, there is
nothing for the analyst to observe. If the threat of over-
ride effectively constrains a court, then the override
power need not be used.
In the mid-1990s (Kilroy 1996; Stone Sweet and
Caporaso 1998), political scientists worked to re-
fine a method, first developed by Stein (1981),2 to
test these and other hypotheses about how the EU
legal system works. This approach involves evalu-
ating the influence of amici briefs—filed by MSGs
and the EU Commission—on the ECJ’s rulings. Be-
cause these briefs—“Observations” in EU parlance—
advise the ECJ on how it should rule on the legal ques-
tions constituting any given case, they embody revealed
preferences. The analysis of briefing activity provides
leverage on the observational problem just discussed:
How can the analyst assess the influence of the briefing
2 Stein focused on the early “constitutional” decisions of the ECJ,
the most important of which established the doctrines of direct effect
and supremacy. The doctrine of direct effect entitles individuals to
plead rights found in treaties and in directives (an important type of
EU statute that member states are obliged to ‘transpose” as national
law), directly before national courts. The doctrine of supremacy re-
quires national judges to resolve any conflict between EU law and
national law by giving primacy to EU law. Stein found that none of
the signatories of the Rome Treaty filed a brief in support of any
of the court’s major moves, whereas each of the MSGs opposed the
court in at least one of them. Those who would argue that the court
has been systematically constrained by the threat of noncompliance
and override bear the burden of explaining these rulings (including
the rulings on state liability discussed later) that the court rendered,
in the face of noncompliance, to enhance the capacity of the system
to deal with noncompliance. The majority of the cases in the CGH
data set were brought pursuant to litigation under the doctrine of
direct effect.
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parties or the threat of override on the court’s rulings?
If, on any legal question before the court, MSGs wish
to signal their legal preferences, or threaten override,
they can file briefs. The analyst then tracks the court
decision making with reference to briefed positions
to assess not only the influence of these positions but
also the threat of override.3 Variations on the method
have been applied relatively systematically, within and
across legal-policy domains (e.g., Cichowski 1998; 2004;
2007; McCown 2003; Nyikos 2000; Stone Sweet 2004).
The results have been remarkably consistent. Scholars
have found (i) that the threat of override was not credi-
ble; (ii) that formal claims of alleged noncompliance on
the part of MSGs neither intimidated nor paralyzed the
court, but rather provided the ECJ with opportunities
to develop an expansive and progressive case law; and
(iii) that the court was far more responsive to the briefs
of the commission—the ECJ’s presumed partner in con-
structing judicial and supranational authority—than to
those of MSGs, even the most powerful ones. Intergov-
ernmentalist theory was largely abandoned, and ap-
proaches compatible with neofunctionalism flourished
(literature reviewed in Stone Sweet 2010).
There is broad consensus on the view that
the ECJ has been a powerful catalyst of market
and political integration, in part, because its pro-
integrative rulings are effectively insulated from mem-
ber state override (Alter 2008; Cichowski 2007;
Pollack 2003; Stone Sweet 2004, 2010; Tallberg 2002a).
The underlying rationale is straightforward: For any
important and controversial ruling of the court, MSGs
are likely to be divided and unable to muster the votes
required to overturn it. We found that unanimity is the
decision rule governing override in more than 90% of
the cases in which MSGs filed briefs in the CGH data
set. In less than 10% of these cases, the decision rule
is a qualified majority (QM), which CGH (440) opera-
tionalize as 70% of the weighted votes of the MSGs in
the Council of Ministers. There is not one instance of a
successful override in their data set; indeed, we know
of no significant case in the history of adjudicating the
treaties. We identified two rulings in the CGH data
set that provoked the MSGs to make formal decisions
expressly designed to override the court or to constrain
its latitude in future cases (discussed later). These ef-
forts failed—the court brushed them aside—a fact that
should weigh heavily in this debate.
Everyone agrees that the ECJ seeks to elicit compli-
ance with its decisions and that it often leaves sub-
stantial room to maneuver to national officials, in-
cluding judges, to enhance compliance. Yet there is
also strong consensus for the view that the ECJ is
not constrained in any systematic way by the threat
3 In their discussion of earlier scholarship on this topic, CGH stated
(436), “Some scholars argue that observing governments taken to
court regularly, ruled against regularly, and complying regularly is
prima facie evidence that governments are constrained to obey ad-
verse court rulings.” To our knowledge, no one has ever argued
this position. Scholars have always treated how (i) the ECJ and the
national courts decide noncompliance cases and how (ii) the MSGs
react to a finding of noncompliance by the courts as two distinct
empirical questions.
of MSG noncompliance. After all, the EU’s legal sys-
tem has uniquely evolved to deal with compliance fail-
ures (Kelemen 2010; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998;
Tallberg 2002b). Over the past two decades, scholars
have charted how noncompliance on the part of MSGs
has generated litigation and helped organize the court’s
dynamic construction of EU law, thereby creating new
compliance failures. However, no one has found that
the progressive evolution of the ECJ’s case law, a truly
remarkable edifice, has been stunted by the threat of
noncompliance. CGH do not identify a single instance
in which a threat of noncompliance has constrained the
court.
The position CGH have staked against these consen-
sus positions is based on specific theoretical commit-
ments, not data. In their model of the EU’s legal system
(439), the MSGs, rather than the ECJ and the national
courts, constitute the EU’s third-party enforcement
mechanism.4 The court’s job in this system is to rat-
ify the MSGs’ legal preferences on an ongoing basis.5
Compared to any other theoretical understanding of
how the EU’s legal system operates, CGH’s model
systematically underestimates the ECJ’s autonomous
capacity to make law and the central role played by
national judges in supervising state compliance.
Under Art. 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU), the national courts
furnished nearly two-thirds of all of the legal questions
in the CGH data set; the vast majority concerned
allegations of noncompliance brought by individuals,
firms, and interest groups. If, in its answers to the
referring judge, the ECJ determines (or implies)
that national law is in noncompliance with EU law,
then it is the judiciary, not the government, that will
take the authoritative decision “to comply” or “not
to comply.”6 When it comes to the implementation
of a preliminary ruling by the judge sending the
reference, judicial compliance is very high. In the most
comprehensive study to date, Nykios (2003) found
that referring judges implemented the ECJ’s rulings
in 96% of cases analyzed in five legal systems (Nyikos
2003).7 In the EU, it is most often national judges
4 CGH (439): “[T]he credibility of a litigant member state’s threat of
noncompliance should weaken as the likelihood of third-party (i.e.,
other member states) enforcement increases. And this implies that,
if the Court values compliance with its rulings, the likelihood that
the Court rules against the litigant government position will depend
on the likelihood of this third-party enforcement.”
5 Under CGH’s theory, one would expect the member states to sue
one another for noncompliance under Art. 259 TFEU, which is de-
signed for that purpose. In the period covered by CGH, however,
the ECJ did not render a single ruling pursuant to an Art. 259 suit.
To date, there have only been three such rulings.
6 If the courts refuse to apply a national law, in deference to the
ECJ’s case law, then how is it possible for an MSG to implement a
decision “not to comply”? CGH do not tell us. Without the support
of the courts, an MSG would be unable to sustain any administrative
decision to apply a national legal norm against an individual, once
that norm was found by the courts to be in conflict with EU law.
7 Nyikos (2000) also found that MSG briefs had little effect in in-
fluencing ECJ rulings in three domains of law—equal treatment and
pay, free movement of goods, and free movement of workers—during
the 1961–94 period.
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who work to “restore compliance” (Panke 2007),
even in “politically sensitive” areas (Panke 2009).
JURISDICTION OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
The CGH data set contains information collected
from European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings that
came to the court under three provisions of the
Treaty of Rome, now the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU; entry into force
December 1, 2009).
Under Art. 258 TFEU, the European Commission
(EC) may initiate “infringement proceedings”—also
called “enforcement actions”—against a member
state for noncompliance with EC law. Rounds of
negotiation ensue; if these fail, the commission may
refer the matter to the ECJ for decision. The com-
mission’s discretion to bring such suits is absolute. In
Art. 258 litigation, the defendant is always a member
state, and the plaintiff is always the commission.
Under Art. 263 TFEU, the ECJ presides over “an-
nulment actions,” suits brought by private parties,
the member states, or European Union (EU) or-
gans seeking to invalidate acts of the EU’s govern-
ing bodies. In this litigation, only an EU organ can
ever be a defendant; the member states can never be
defendants, and national compliance with EU law is
never the issue before the court.
Under Art. 267 TFEU, national judges send
questions—preliminary references—to the ECJ in
order to obtain an interpretation of EU law, when it
is material to the resolution of a dispute at national
bar. The ECJ responds in the form of a judgment—
a preliminary ruling—that the referring judge is ex-
pected to apply to resolve the case. The vast majority
of these cases involve an allegation on the part of a
private party (an individual, firm, or interest group)
that a specific national law, or practice permitted
or required under national law, is in noncompliance
with EU law. The national legal order is, in effect,
the “defendant” in these cases. If the allegation is
upheld, the national judge is expected to give prior-
ity to EU law, while setting aside conflicting national
law (under the doctrine of supremacy).
Before proceeding, we need to clear away a false
issue. We agree with CGH that the best practice for
evaluating the robustness of “political constraints” on
ECJ decision making is to analyze the court’s posi-
tion on every legal question briefed by an MSG and
the commission.8 Among other information, they code
how the court addressed the various questions raised in
each case (in binary terms: whether the court sided with
8 Although CGH (436) claim that their method is “novel,” it is a
variation of the approach developed by scholars whom CGH criticize
in their article.
or against the plaintiff) and how the commission and
the MSGs briefed these same questions. Quite sensibly,
CGH then “weigh” each MSG’s brief according to the
number of votes that MSG has been assigned in the
Council of Ministers under qualified majority (QM)
voting rules. They can then derive a “net weighted po-
sition,” which can be either (i) positive, when weighted
briefs sum up to support the plaintiff; (ii) negative,
when the weighted briefs sum up to oppose the plain-
tiff; or (iii) zero, when no MSG filed a brief on a ques-
tion or when the briefing MSGs cancel each other out.
CGH use various statistical techniques to measure
the extent to which ECJ rulings align with the posi-
tions briefed, but depart from standard practice in one
crucial respect: They count every ECJ decision that is
congruent with the net weighted position of the MSGs
as support for their hypotheses. In such cases, CGH
assume that the ECJ was “constrained” to decide as it
did, because of the threats of override and noncompli-
ance. The approach, however, can only help the analyst
assess the “influence”—or persuasive effect—of briefs
on outcomes; it cannot directly evaluate the proposed
explanation of this influence (see the later discussion).
If a court follows a line argued in one of the briefs sub-
mitted to it, why should an observer presume that the
outcome can only be explained by “political” threats?
We submit that CGH’s approach would not make sense
in any other legal system in which effective judicial
review has been established, and it makes no sense for
the EU.
HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Hypothesis 1 (H1) embodies the override mechanism:
“The more credible the threat of override . . . the more
likely the court is to rule in favor of the governments’
favored position” (CGH 439). We consider this formu-
lation to be appropriate and reasonable. CGH further
suggest, sensibly, that “the threat of legislative override
increases with the likelihood that a sufficiently large
coalition of member states would pursue legislation or
treaty revision in response to an ECJ ruling” (440).
Yet CGH then stack the deck in favor of their position,
stipulating that the decision rule governing override
will always be QM, arguing as follows (440): “Unfortu-
nately, we cannot easily distinguish which legal issues
can be overridden by QM and which require unanimity
support.”
In fact, determining the override rule for each case is
straightforward.9 Unanimity governs override for the
following: all rulings on treaty law, including every case
in the domains of free movement of goods, services,
and workers, antitrust, and every legal basis dispute
under Art. 263; all rulings that concern EU legislation
adopted under unanimity rules (the vast majority of
statutes litigated in CGH’s data set); all rulings pur-
suant to Art. 267 preliminary questions related to the
9 In their coding protocol, CGH state that they coded the “legal
basis” of the EU law being adjudicated by the court. Legal basis
determines the rule governing adoption of a legal provision and thus
determines the override rule.
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doctrines of direct effect, supremacy, remedies, and
general principles of EU law, including fundamental
rights; and more. As noted, for more than 90% of the
cases in which MSGs weighed in, the override rule was
unanimity, not QM.
Because CGH do not stipulate a threshold point at
which the threat of override is credible, H1 would ap-
pear to be impossible to test. Further, CGH do not
describe a single instance in which a threat of over-
ride was actually made, and they do not even provide
a “stylized” example of how their mechanism might
work. Instead, CGH (436) declare that the necessary
votes to override can be gathered through “logrolling,”
the entire discussion of which is as follows (436): “Over-
ride requires a government, or set of governments, op-
posed to the court’s preferred ruling to cobble together
a logroll. Further, protocols can ease the logrolling
process in treaty revision.” Although H1 implies, and
rightly so, that the threat of override would be credi-
ble only when a “sufficiently large coalition” of MSGs
weighs in, CGH treat the threat as present even in
cases when only one MSG, which might be as small
as Luxembourg or Portugal, has filed a brief in favor
of a defendant member state. This move conflicts with
the precepts of intergovernmentalism, which predicts
that only powerful states can constrain the court (e.g.,
Garrett 1992).
Hypothesis 2 (H2) embodies their approach to non-
compliance: “The more opposition a litigant govern-
ment has from other MSGs, the more likely the court
is to rule against that litigant government” (439). Note
that testing H2 as formulated does not give us infor-
mation on the extent to which the threat of noncom-
pliance actually constrains the court’s decision mak-
ing. Instead, H2 focuses attention on what happens
in situations in which at least one nonlitigating MSG
encourages the court to punish a defendant MSG. The
logic of the mechanism is permissive rather than con-
straining. CGH do not identify any instance in which
a threat of noncompliance has constrained the court,
and they do not furnish criteria for determining when a
threat of noncompliance is actually made. Instead, they
assume that (a) the threat of noncompliance inheres in
every case and that (b) the threat will in every case
constrain the ECJ except when the court is supported
by the nondefendant member states. “If governments
have the ability to ignore adverse rulings,” CGH (439)
declare, “the court can only expect compliance with its
rulings when non-litigating governments are willing to
punish the defecting government for noncompliance.”
CGH present no data or analysis on noncompliance,
beyond alleged instances that generate a judicial ruling.
Instead, CGH test H2, which does not test the effect
of a threat of noncompliance on the court’s decision
making.
Most worrisome, CGH choose not to test H1—
whether the threat of override constrains the court’s de-
cision making—as originally formulated. Instead, they
operationalize H1 “as the net number of member-
state observations in favor of the plaintiff (defendant)
increases, the likelihood that the court rules for the
plaintiff (defendant) increases” (440), which makes it
virtually identical to H2 (CGH, 438: “The more oppo-
sition a litigant government has from other member-
state governments, the more likely the court is to rule
against that litigant government”). The move has dra-
matic consequences for how findings will be inter-
preted. CGH can now count as evidence in support
of H1 any instance in which the court rules in favor
of a plaintiff when that ruling is congruent with the
net weight of MSG observations in favor of a plain-
tiff (even if only one MSG weighs in and the override
rule is unanimity), and they can count as evidence in
support of H2 any instance in which the court rules
against a defendant MSG when that ruling is congruent
with the net weight of MSG observations against that
defendant. Thus altered, H1 and H2 will test the same
relationships among variables, on the same data.
CGH’s design—a point that applies to the standard
method they have adapted—provides the observer with
information on the extent to which briefs (the inde-
pendent variable) predict, or presage, or are consistent
with ECJ rulings (the dependent variable) on any given
legal question. The design, however, is not capable of
testing H1, as originally stated, because CGH do not
assess the credibility of the threat. In addition, CGH
do not test the effects of a threat of noncompliance
on the court’s decision making. Instead, they test H2,
which provides information only on whether the ECJ
responds favorably when MSGs urge it to censure a
defendant MSG.
ANALYSIS (1): OVERRIDE AND
NONCOMPLIANCE
In this section, we respond to two empirical questions.
First, how credible is the threat of override? For the
mechanism to constrain the court systematically, the
evidence must show that the threat of override is cred-
ible. Second, to what extent does the evidence show
that noncompliance on the part of MSGs constrains
the court? CGH do not report the data that directly
bear on these questions.10 Nonetheless, on the basis
of the case numbers contained in CGH’s data set and
their coding of the net weighted positions of the MSGs,
we collected and analyzed this information. We report
our findings here.
The data set contains cases that come to the court
through three procedures, only two of which are rele-
vant to CGH’s project: Articles 258 and 267 TFEU.11
CGH also include data from Art. 263 annulment ac-
tions in tests of H1 and H2. Yet suits under Art. 263 can
only be brought against EU organs; MSGs can never
10 CGH declined to provide us with the data on which their analyses
are based: information on which MSGs filed observations, concern-
ing which legal questions, in support of which party. Thus, it is often
impossible to verify whether the net weighted positions of MSGs
were coded correctly on any question. CGH provided us only with the
aggregate data to replicate their specific models, withholding what
is most important: the raw underlying data. In our own analysis of
important rulings, we found coding errors (reported in Stone Sweet
and Brunell 2011).
11 Provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union.
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be defendants. Thus, to test propositions concerning
MSG noncompliance, CGH include data drawn from
593 rulings and 662 legal questions (more than 20% of
the total number of observations in their data set) in
which national noncompliance can never be the legal
issue.
Art. 258 infringement proceedings are brought by
the European Commission alleging member state non-
compliance with EU law. These suits directly involve
the question of whether the threats of noncompliance
(the MSG has decided not to comply with the law
as the commission understands it, under the threat of
adjudication) and override constrain the legal system.
We analyzed 444 Art. 258 rulings in the CGH data
set.12 MSGs filed zero observations or did not take a
weighted position in 93.5% (415/444) of these cases.
Thus, MSGs are only occasional participants in the
only legal procedure specifically designed to deal with
member state noncompliance with EU law. The ECJ
sides with the commission against the defendant state
in more than 90% of these cases.13
The member states registered a weighted position
in only 6.5% (n = 29) of these rulings. Of these 29
cases, MSGs supported the defendant state in 1514; that
is, in only 3.4% of all Art. 258 cases was override a
possible consideration. Although the override rule was
unanimity in each of these 15 cases, the mean weighted
position of MSGs in support of the defendant state was
12.6% of the vote under QM procedures. It deserves
emphasis that 12.6% of a QM is less than the weight
of one large state, such as France, Germany, or the
United Kingdom. Recall that Hypothesis 1 states that
“threats of override are potentially credible whenever
a government, or set of governments, can produce a
coalition sufficient to override the court’s decision.”
In not one Art. 258 case does a coalition of MSGs
supporting a defendant state on a legal question exceed
25% (3 of the 12–15 votes needed to override). The
threat of override does not constrain the court, because
it is not a credible threat.
12 We left out two rulings that CGH erroneously coded as Art. 258
enforcement actions (320/95 is a preliminary ruling; 129/86 is an
annulment action). The data sets are riddled with errors, one of
which is systematic. CGH did not code the number of issues in Art.
258 infringement proceedings consistently, even in similar cases. We
decided that the best way to handle this problem would be to treat
all Art. 258 rulings as involving a single legal question: compliance
or noncompliance.
13 Twelve rulings pursuant to infringement proceedings concerned
cases brought by the commission for failure on the part of an MSG
to comply with a prior Art. 258 ruling, and the defendant state lost all
of these. Although we agree with CGH that neither the commission
nor the court can force an MSG “to obey adverse rulings” (CGH
436), noncompliance with an ECJ ruling generates more proceedings,
settlement activity, and more rulings of noncompliance when efforts
to settle fail, as more comprehensive studies have shown (Börzel,
Hofman, and Panke 2008). We do not see how this dynamic can be
squared with CGH’s claims.
14 The distribution: in one case, three MSGs supported the defendant
state; in four cases, two did so; in ten cases, one MSG supported the
defendant state. CGH’s data set contains 17 such cases, but two
rulings (141/87 and 137/96) were coded erroneously, because in fact
no member state filed a brief in either.
We now turn to CGH’s data on Art. 267 activity,
cases in which the court responds to questions referred
by national judges; most but not all of these questions
relate to compliance issues. CGH code 2,048 legal ques-
tions answered in 1,209 ECJ rulings. On the majority of
questions raised (1,122 of 2,048), either no MSG filed
a brief or CGH coded the net position as zero. In only
six instances did MSGs take a net position against the
plaintiff-individual that reached at least 50% of a vote
under the QM voting procedure (plaintiffs “win” three
of these cases), although the rule governing override
in each was in fact unanimity. In only one of 1,209
rulings does a coalition of MSGs reach as many as
6 of the 12–15 votes necessary to override the court
on any question. CGH do not report this information,
but instead suggest that an unexplained “logrolling”
process can “cobble together” a unanimous vote.
Now consider CGH’s data as a whole. Figure 1 de-
picts the distribution of values on CGH’s main inde-
pendent variable: member state briefs weighted as a
function of their share of votes in the Council of Min-
isters under QM voting procedures. In more than two-
thirds of all issues coded, MSGs take no net weighted
position. In 11.8% of the legal questions in the data set
(375/3,176), CGH code MSGs as registering a position
in favor of the plaintiff. The mean average score in
such cases is 14.4% of a QM in the council, slightly
more than the vote of one large state. In 20.3% of the
legal questions in the data set, CGH code MSGs as
taking a position in favor of the defendant (in CGH’s
model, override is a consideration), the mean score of
which is 15.1% of a QM; again, this is short of the
combined votes of, say, France and any other state.
As Figure 1 makes clear, MSGs do not come close to
reaching a QM, let alone unanimity, in any systemat-
ically meaningful way. Moreover, in many rulings, the
net weighted positions are the result of a split, in which
at least one MSG had submitted a brief supporting
each side.15 Under unanimity rules, the potential for
MSGs to logroll a decision to override in cases where
MSGs are split must be very close to zero. If, as CGH
argue (338), the threat of override is not credible, then
it cannot constrain the ECJ, let alone systematically.
CGH’s claims to the contrary are inexplicable.
We also examined what happened when MSGs
adopted measures designed to override or constrain
the scope of rulings rendered by the ECJ. The data
set contains two major episodes: one concerning oc-
cupational pensions16 and the other the designation
of wildlife preservation areas.17 In both instances, the
measures taken failed to constrain the court. This out-
come deserves emphasis. When MSGs actually made
good on their threat to nullify the effects of ECJ rulings,
the ECJ prevailed.
15 For reasons discussed in footnote 11, it is impossible to count how
many such splits occurred.
16 Barber, ECJ C-262/88 [1990] ECR I-1889; Vroege, ECJ C-57/93
[1994] ECR I-4541; Fisscher, ECJ C-128/93 [1994] ECR I-4583.
17 Commission v. Germany, ECJ C-57/89 [1991] ECR 2849; Commis-
sion v. Spain, ECJ C-355/90 [1993] ECR I-4221; Lappel Bank, ECJ
C-44/95 [1996] ECR I-3805.
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FIGURE 1. Distribution of Net Weighted Positions Taken by the Member States on Legal Questions
in the CGH Data Set
Note: The graph depicts the distribution of the major independent variable in CGH (2008): the normalized net weighted positions taken
by the member states in briefs to the ECJ on legal questions in the CGH data set (N = 3,269). Source of the data: CGH (2008).
The CGH data set also contains a set of landmark
“constitutional” rulings that established the doctrine of
state liability: holding that a member state can be held
financially responsible, in national courts, for damages
caused to individuals due to compliance failures.18 The
court, in partnership with national judges, developed
this case law in the face of an exceptional number
of MSGs (France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the
Netherlands) filing briefs on the major legal questions.
MSGs argued, among other things, that EU law does
not require state liability (the TFEU is silent on reme-
dies) and that a remedy for state noncompliance with
EU law must be provided through legislation or express
treaty revision, not through judicial fiat. The court re-
jected these arguments, siding with the commission.
We provide a detailed account of all three episodes
elsewhere (Stone Sweet and Brunell 2011). Taken to-
gether, the cases provide a crucial (qualitative) test of
the claims of CGH and Garrett and Weingast (1993)
at issue here, in that they are cases “most likely” to fit
an override model: The court should have been con-
strained.
In the end, CGH’s major claims are based on one
positive result: On a legal question in which MSGs
register a net weighted position, the ECJ is likely to
18 Francovich, Case C-6 &amp; 9/90 [1991] ECR I-5357; Brasserie du
Pecheur, Case C-46/93 and C-48/93 [1996] ECR I-1029.
decide the question in congruence with that weight-
ing. Except for CGH’s assertions, however, there is no
reason to believe that this result is due to the threats
of override and noncompliance. The data reported in
Figure 1, coupled with qualitative analysis of what hap-
pened when the MSGs formally sought to constrain the
court, provide good reason to reject their claims.
ANALYSIS (2): INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
VERSUS NEOFUNCTIONALISM
CGH also claim (449) that their purported findings—
that the threats of override and noncompliance on the
part of MSGs “have large, systematic, and substan-
tively significant effects on judicial decision making”—
strongly support intergovernmentalist integration the-
ory. They argue that the evidence conflicts with ap-
proaches associated with neofunctionalism, which hold
that “while these constraints might matter on the mar-
gin, the court has had the latitude to pursue an
agenda independent of and contrary to MSGs inter-
ests” [emphasis added].
Put in the most basic terms, contemporary
neofunctionalists19 argue that the court and the com-
mission help the member states resolve the fierce
19 For an analysis of the evolution of neofunctionalist theory as an
approach to European integration, see Sandholtz and Stone Sweet
(2010).
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FIGURE 2. The Impact on ECJ Decisions of Observations Filed by the Commission and
Member State Governments
Note: The figure, based on CGH’s Model 1 (CGH, Table 2: 443), plots the predicted probabilities of the ECJ ruling in favor of the plaintiff.
All other variables are set at the mean or mode (N = 3,176). The Commission Neutral line represents the predicted probability when the
commission does not express a preference on a legal question; the Commission Favors Plaintiff line represents the predicted probability
when the commission files a brief in favor of the plaintiff. Dashed lines trace the 95% confidence interval for these predicted probabilities.
cooperation dilemmas that attend market and political
integration, not least, through forging links with na-
tional judges and transnational elites who are willing to
invest in these projects (Burley and Mattli 1993; Mattli
1999; Stone Sweet 2004). In the standard account, the
legal system evolves under the tutelage of the ECJ,
which works in conjunction with those who activate
the court for their own purposes, including the com-
mission under Art. 258 (enforcement actions) and pri-
vate litigants and national judges under Art. 267 (pre-
liminary references). In their empirical research, neo-
functionalists found that the legal system developed in
a progressive, self-sustaining way, because the court’s
rulings tend to promote integration (values that inhere
in the treaties), and because decision rules governing
override (unanimity) favor the court’s dominance over
treaty interpretation.
CGH (442) declare that, although “the ECJ may,
on the margin, favor the commission,” the MSGs are
the actors who count, because they “systematically”
constrain the court; however, CGH do not test the
proposition. Confronted with this binary opposition,
a neofunctionalist would predict exactly the opposite—
that the ECJ will side with the commission’s briefs, rela-
tively systematically, although the MSGs may influence
the court on the margins, partly as supplemental to the
weight of the commission. Here we assess the extent
to which the ECJ “favors” the positions of the MSGs
relative to those of the commission.
Using the analytics underlying CGH’s Model 1
(CGH, Table 2: 443), we generated predicted proba-
bilities that would be comparable to the findings they
reported (CGH, Figure 1: 444), adding values for the
commission’s briefing activity. In Figure 2, the y-axis
plots the probability that the ECJ will rule in favor
of the plaintiff. The x-axis charts the distribution of
the CGH’s main variable of interest: the proportion of
MSGs filing an observation in support of the plaintiff.
The top line represents predicted probabilities when
the commission favors a ruling for the plaintiff, and the
bottom line plots predictions when the commission is
neutral. Note the gap between the lines. When the com-
mission favors the plaintiff, the court listens. The slope
of the line indicates that the positive and statistically
significant impact of MSG briefs in support of the plain-
tiff is actually relatively modest. A modestly significant
finding such as this one is not necessarily a substantively
interesting finding, and CGH provide no evidence that
the finding is of substantive interest. As important, we
see no reason to accept that CGH’s finding constitutes
sufficient support for CGH’s proposed causal explana-
tion or intergovernmentalist claims, given that the rest
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of the evidence strongly indicates that their theory is
wrong.
Figure 2 reports a finding for all rulings in the CGH
data set. For contestable reasons, CGH do not consider
the outcome of Art. 258 enforcement actions, which
directly concern state noncompliance with EU law, to
be a fair test of their theory.20 As noted, the commission
prevails against the defendant member state in 90% of
the ECJ’s Art. 258 decisions, which would presumably
count against CGH’s positions. We therefore examine
what remains: rulings generated by the Art. 267 pre-
liminary reference procedure.
Of the 2,048 questions on which the ECJ rendered a
preliminary ruling, the commission filed observations
in 77.7% (n = 1,588), and MSGs produced a weighted
position in 45.2% (n = 926). When the commission
takes the plaintiff’s side (n = 841), the court rules in
favor of the plaintiff 79.9% of the time, compared to the
member states’ lower (70.8%) success rate in far fewer
cases (n = 342). When the commission files observa-
tions against the plaintiff (n = 747), the ECJ rules in
favor of the defendant 77.7% of the time, compared to
the member states’ far lower (57.2%) success rate (n =
584). The success rate of MSGs is far higher when they
encourage the ECJ to punish a member state than when
they seek to constrain the court from finding against
a defendant state’s law and practices, although MSGs
participate in the latter, less successful activity far more
than they do in the former.
We see a fundamental difference between situations
in which (a) the MSGs ask the court not to develop
EU law in new directions and (b) the MSGs urge the
ECJ to find against a defendant state on the basis of
common understandings of EU law developed by the
court. In the latter situation, the MSGs are not so much
“constraining” the court, as enabling it. Further, as just
noted, the MSGs’ rate of success is highest when they
join the commission against the defendant state. In
testing their theory, CGH do not distinguish between
these situations. Instead, instances in which the MSGs
join the commission in encouraging the court to punish
a defendant state are actually counted as evidence in
support of both hypotheses, and then against neofunc-
tionalist theory.
20 To explain away why “the Court should not typically face threats
of override” in the Art. 258 setting, CGH (436) state that “the Com-
mission normally brings an infringement charge against a member
state on questions where a clear legal principle has emerged based on
a series of previous cases. In other words, the Commission’s position
is normally based on an interpretation of EU law that has survived
multiple opportunities for member states to challenge or amend it
via legislative override.” This argument resembles a neofunctionalist,
not an intergovernmentalist, position: the court builds the law that
the commission exploits in the service of its own policy agenda. In
fact, it is often the case that the commission brings actions to induce
the ECJ to build the law in a progressive fashion, and then the ECJ
responds positively, a dynamic that CGH do not consider. If the
Art. 258 system actually worked the way the CGH claim, then it is
unclear how the court’s case law of “clear legal principles” emerged
in the first place, because such principles are commonly built on
findings of noncompliance in cases in which member states rarely
file observations. In CGH’s theoretical world, the court should have
been constrained.
The critical question is the following: What happens
when the commission opposes the net weighted po-
sitions taken by the MSGs? If CGH are right—that
the ECJ is constrained by the MSGs and favors the
commission only “on the margins”—then one should
expect the commission’s briefs to be relatively inef-
fectual when opposing the MSGs. There are 96 legal
questions in the data set on which the commission
supported the defendant and MSGs took a weighted
position supporting the plaintiff; in these, the ECJ fa-
vored the MSGs’ position in only 36.5% (n = 35) of
these cases. There are 234 legal questions in which the
commission filed an observation in favor of the plaintiff
and MSGs took a net weighted position supporting
the defendant. On 70.1% of these issues (n = 164),
the court agreed with the commission, finding for the
plaintiff. Thus, when MSGs oppose the commission
(n = 330), the commission prevails more than two-
thirds of the time—a landslide. CGH report no findings
on the questions raised in this section. Instead, they
assert that their more general data analysis somehow
constitutes support for intergovernmentalism (449).
In Table 1, we present a comprehensive probit anal-
ysis of these relationships. We sought to determine the
effect on ECJ rulings of two of the court’s important
constituents: the commission and the MSGs.21 For the
member states, we used the CGH’s own “net weighted
observations” variable. Following CGH’s design, if,
on any legal question, that variable took on positive
values, we coded the MSGs position as favoring the
plaintiff; if it was negative, we coded their position as
favoring the defendant; and when the variable took
on values of zero, we coded the MSGs preference as
neutral on the question. In the same way, either the
commission filed an observation for the plaintiff, the
defendant, or no observation at all.22
The commission and the MSGs may take one of three
different positions: in favor of the plaintiff, in favor
of the defendant, or remaining neutral. Because there
are nine possible combinations, we created a series
of dummy variables for eight of these nine combina-
tions (the excluded category containing those cases on
which both the commission and the MSGs are neutral
toward the preferred disposition of the case). For a
neofunctionalist-based approach to prevail, the coeffi-
cients must take on positive values when the commis-
sion favors the plaintiff (the dependent variable takes
on the value of 1 when the ECJ finds in favor of the
plaintiff, and 0 when it finds for the defendant), and
negative values when the commission favors the de-
fendant. As Table 1 shows, both conditions are met.
21 We are not claiming that these are the court’s only or most im-
portant constituents. In Art. 267 cases, private litigants and national
judges are the crucial actors.
22 The design allows us to compare what happens when the MSGs (a)
are on the same side as the commission, (b) oppose the commission,
or (c) register no net weighted position relative to one taken by
the commission, an analysis that CGH’s model does not permit. In
CGH’s model, the dependent variable ranges from −1 to 1, but
as Figure 1 shows, variation on the variable is narrow, and the net
weighted positions of MSGs never approach a level in which the
threat of override could be considered credible.
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TABLE 1. Probit Analysis of the
Relationship between Briefs and
European Court of Justice Rulings for
the Plaintiff under Art. 267 TFEU





































Notes: Entries are unstandardized probit coefficients with
standard errors in parentheses. We used robust standard
errors with clusters for each case. Source of the data: CGH
(2008).
∗∗∗ p < .001, two-tailed test.
Whenever the commission favors the defendant, re-
gardless of the position of the MSGs, the coefficient
is negative and statistically significant—even when the
governments’ “net weighted” position favors the plain-
tiff. The reverse is also true: When the commission sides
with the plaintiff, the coefficient is positive and statis-
tically significant, even when the MSGs have taken
a position in favor of the defendant. Thus, when the
commission and the MSGs oppose one another, the
ECJ finds in favor of the side the commission supports
in a statistically significant fashion.
Now consider what happens when the commission
does not file an observation. When the commission is
neutral and the MSGs favor the plaintiff, the coeffi-
cient takes on a bare positive value, but it is statis-
tically indistinguishable from zero. In instances when
the commission is neutral and, on balance, the MSGs
favor the defendant, the coefficient takes on a positive
value, which indicates that more cases are being de-
cided for the plaintiff; yet, the variable is not statistically
significant. In sum, when the commission takes a po-
sition on how a legal question should be decided, the
court tends to comfort that position, in a statistically
significant way, even when the MSGs prefer the op-
posite outcome. But when the commission takes no
position on how a legal question ought to be decided,
we find no statistically significant evidence that the ECJ
favors the side preferred by the governments.
CONCLUSION
CGH’s major claims are not supported by their own
data. The threat of override was not credible and could
not constrain the court in any systematic way. When
member state governments did move to nullify the
effects of controversial ECJ rulings, they failed to con-
strain the court, which continued down paths cleared by
the prior rulings. CGH did not show how the substan-
tive development of any domain of EU law has been
stunted by the threat of noncompliance, and the ECJ’s
case law has continued to grow into a dense and impos-
ing edifice. State noncompliance stimulated rather than
paralyzed the development of the EU’s legal system;
the emergence of the doctrine of state liability, which
was strongly opposed by MSGs but supported by the
commission, is a striking example. The data also show
that, in a head-to-head showdown, (i) the commission
and neofunctional theory dominate (ii) the MSGs and
intergovernmentalist theory as predictors of ECJ rul-
ings. In sum, using CGH’s own data, preferred meth-
ods, and theoretical constructions of integration theory,
we confirm the findings of prior scholarship on the ECJ
and legal integration, and refute CGH’s claims.
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